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In 2011, the world population reached another milestone 
of seven billion people and according to the United Nations 
World Population Prospects’ (2011) projections, it will grow 
by almost 1.4 billion people by 2030.1 In 2010, Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) comprised 12 percent of the world’s population, 
which is expected to increase to 16 percent by 2030 (United 
Nations, 2011). This is driven by average annual population 
growth rates of above two percent for the entire period to 
2030 (albeit declining), as well as considerable declines in 
infant and child mortality (Lam and Leibbrandt, 2013). This 
transition to lower birth and death rates is known as the 
demographic transition and has important implications for 
the size of Africa’s working age population and thus labour 
force. 
The regional population growth rate projections for the 
period 2010-2030 are illustrated in Figure 1.  The graph 
makes it clear that the population of the working age – de-
fined as age 15-64 – is projected to contract in Europe and 
grow in single digits for North America.  The growth of the 
global workforce will be driven by Asia, Latin America and 
Africa. More specifically, the region that is projected to have 
the fastest growing working age population is Africa. This 
translates into a working age population of 793 million in 
2030, a 70 percent rise from the current 466 million (Table 
1).  To get there, it is projected that SSA will add 15.6 million 
people on average per year to the working age population 
in 2015-2020, rising to 17.2 million per year in 2020-2025, 
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1 All projections beyond 2010 use the UN Population Division’s Medium Variant projections.
2 The growth rates for Africa include North Africa, hence the discrepancy between the working age population growth from 2010 to 2030 in Figure 1 and 
Table 1. Nonetheless, both Africa and SSA are expected to follow a similar trend in the growth of its working age population.  
Figure 1: Percentage increase in size of age groups in 
working-age population, 2010 to 2030 (Medium Variant) 2
and to 19 million per year in 2025-2030. The global jobs 
challenge then, in regional terms, is disproportionately an 
African challenge. 
Source:  Lam and Leibbrandt (2013) using data from ILO (2011) 
2
3 Using SSA’s 2010 labour force participation rate of 69 percent (calculated from Table 1 and 2), which is then multiplied by the projected 2030 working 
age population in SSA. 
Understanding the composition of the 
growth in the working age population 
is important given that it is the rapid 
entry of young workers that is most 
likely to put pressure on the labour 
market. Its importance is further high-
lighted by the association of high rates 
of youth unemployment in Africa and 
the Middle East with ongoing political 
unrest across these regions. 
Figure 2 plots three different meas-
ures of the youth labour force (age 
15-24) for five countries across Latin 
America, Asia and Africa – the abso-
lute size of the youth labour force in 
the left panel, the annual growth rate 
in the middle panel, and its contribu-
tion to the total labour force in the 
right panel. In all the countries, except 
Nigeria, there is little evidence of a 
‘youth bulge’ seeing as there are de-
clining growth rates of this age group 
compared to the 1970s as well as a 
falling proportion of youth in the total 
proportion of the labour force. 
Looking at Nigeria, Africa’s most pop-
ulous country, the ‘youth bulge’ ap-
pears more pronounced. While the 
growth rate has fallen from its mid-
1990s peak, it remains above two 
percent until 2030, resulting in a rel-
atively stable share of the youth in the 
working-age population, compared 
with other African countries. Nigerian 
youth continue to make up over a third 
of the labour force until 2030, consid-
erably higher than in other countries 
in this sample. These trends suggest a 
jobs challenge of about 545 million3 in 
the next 20 years for SSA. 
The fact that Africa’s working age 
population is expected to grow so rap-
idly – particularly amongst the work-
ing youth cohort – serves to highlight 
that it is relatively not as far along in 
its demographic transition. This im-
plies a great opportunity for potential 
growth in the region, however, also 
the increasing challenge of promoting 
growth that is job-creating.      
Ultimately then, the above has sug-
gested a few important trends with 
respect to the future African jobs chal-
lenge. Firstly, that most of the world’s 
working age population growth will 
Table 1. Size of Working-Age Population (age 15-64) for World and Subgroups, 2010-
2030, Millions
Source: Lam and Leibbrandt (2013) and additional calculations by authors’, using data from ILO (2011)
Figure 2. Youth Population (age 15-24) 1960-2030, size, annual growth rate, and 
proportion of  labour force (Medium Variant)
Source:  Lam and Leibbrandt (2013)
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emanate from Africa. From constituting 10 percent of the 
global labour force in 2010, this is set to increase to 15 
percent.  Secondly, most of this growth will originate from 
young workers in Africa, who are set to stream into the la-
bour market at an average annual rate of over two percent4 
in the 2010-2030 period.
II Africa in the Global Labour Market Today
A recent analysis of the global labour market shows that 
of the 3 billion individuals in the global labour force, only 
half of them are in wage employment (Table 2). The pro-
portion of the labour force in wage employment compared 
to these that are self-employed is most stark in SSA. Of the 
297 million employed individuals in SSA, only 21 percent are 
in wage employment. The dominant source of employment 
then is self-employment in the agricultural sector. In SSA, 77 
percent of self-employed individuals are employed in agri-
culture, compared to 59 percent in non-OECD countries, and 
a global average of 60 percent. While more relevant to SSA, 
even at a global level, this figure emphasises the importance 
of the agricultural sector when uncovering the complexities 
of job creation and poverty reduction in most of the devel-
oping world. A further complication in addressing the jobs 
challenge is that, as with differences across the developing 
world in the sector of self-employment, it is likely that in the 
urban centres of SSA, the self-employed are predominantly 
in non-agricultural sectors.
SSA has a total unemployment rate of 7 percent, compared 
to non-OECD and global averages of 6 percent, with SSA 
comprising 15 percent of the non-OECD’s 157 million unem-
ployed individuals. This SSA average, however, hides much 
of the country variation as there are no doubt higher esti-
mates of within-country unemployment. A notable case is 
South Africa’s persistently high rate of unemployment cur-
rently at 25 percent as measured by the narrow definition 
(DPRU, 2013). 
Table 2.  The Global Labour Market at a Glance, 2010 (millions)
Source:  Bhorat (2013a), using data from World Bank (2012) 
Notes: 
1.  The data is based on the World Bank’s International Income Distribution Database (I2D2) dataset, which is a harmonised set 
of household and labour force surveys, drawn from a multitude of countries. 
2. Shares of Regional Labour Force Estimates in parenthesis.
Table 3 represents the sectoral typology of the world’s em-
ployment over the 2000-2011 period in which it shows that 
currently almost 80 percent of the world’s employed are 
either in agriculture or services. This figure that is almost 
92 percent for SSA. Over time, the gradually declining pro-
portion of employment in agriculture in SSA is driven by the 
rise in employment in the services sector, with very little 
increase in the manufacturing and industrial sector, which 
merely contributes 8.5 percent to the regions’ employment. 
This is a key observation given that wage employment and 
its growth is an important indicator of economic develop-
ment. Evidence shows that wage employment as a share of 
total employment increases rapidly as a country progresses 
on its economic development path and conversely, that ag-
riculture peaks at low levels of per capita national income 
and is almost zero for developed countries (Bhorat, 2013a).  
Since labour in SSA is primarily engaged in activities re-
lated to working on land in rural areas or in some form of 
retail-related service, employment creation alone has little 
potential to move these individuals and households out of 
poverty. Therefore, SSA’s concentration of employment out-
side of the industrial sector highlights the further challenge 
of not only creating jobs, but improving the quality of exist-
ing jobs. SSA has had a consistently high rate of vulnerable 
employment over the last decade, ranging between 81 per-
cent and 77 percent, and marginally second only to South 
Asia (ILO, 2012). Furthermore, Table 4 shows that the num-
ber of working poor in SSA – defined as those earning less 
4 The total percentage change of young workers in SSA (age 15-24) over the 2010-2030 period is 55 percent. 
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Table 3: Employment shares by sector, world and regions (%)
Source: ILO (2012)
Notes: 1. * are preliminary estimates
Table 4: Working poor indicators, world and regions (US$2 a day)
Source: ILO (2012)
Notes: 1. * are preliminary estimates
Ultimately, the typology of Africa’s jobs challenge is evident 
in the above data. In the first instance because agriculture is 
so central to the average African economy, policies designed 
to grow this sector, increase its global competitiveness and 
essentially serve as mechanisms for reducing the incidence 
of working poverty is critical. Secondly, large swathes of pre-
dominantly young people are entering Africa’s fast-growing 
cities in search of employment. The majority end up in ur-
ban self-employment. 
Making the informal sector a more sustainable form of em-
ployment, engendering linkages to the formal sector, and 
providing an enabling business environment for this sector 
to thrive is essential to meet this continent’s job challenge. 
than $2 a day – currently at 193 million people, constitutes 
almost two-thirds of the total employed and is approximate-
ly eight times the number of unemployed in the region. 
The pattern of the changes in the number of the ultra-poor 
(those earning below US$1.25 a day) are consistent and 
show a distinct redistribution of the world’s working poor 
from East Asia and SE Asia and the Pacific to South Asia and 
SSA – with almost a third of the world’s working ultra-poor 
residing in SSA, up from 18 percent in 2000 (Bhorat, 2013a). 
Thus, while the proportion of the working poor in total em-
ployment in SSA has seen gradual improvements since 2000, 
the fundamental jobs challenge problem in the region re-
mains the problem of the working poor.
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III Pursuing a Jobs-Intensive Growth Strategy: A Post-2015   
 Remit
The UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have guid-
ed international development policy over the last two and a 
half decades and as 2015 signals its conclusion, the focus has 
been shifted to the post-2015 development agenda. A recent 
High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons (HLP) was convened to 
design such an agenda, and has called for five transformative 
shifts. Importantly, these shifts include placing ‘sustainable 
development’ at the core as well as a focus on job-generating 
economic growth, which is associated with the current ten-
or of the economic development discourse, which promotes 
the idea of inclusive growth. Here the report states that 
“there must be a commitment to rapid, equitable growth – 
not growth at any cost or just short-term spurts in growth, 
but sustained, long-term, inclusive growth that can over-
come the challenges of unemployment (especially youth un-
employment), resource scarcity and – perhaps the biggest 
challenge of all – adaptation to climate change” (United Na-
tions, 2013:8) 
For Africa to reach its growth potential, it is important to 
consider both the opportunity and the challenge of the de-
mographic dividend highlighted in the previous section. 
The rapid rise in the working age population will mean a 
new mass consumer market for goods and services on the 
continent, particularly in fast growing and populous coun-
tries such as Nigeria, Kenya and Ethiopia (Bhorat, 2013b). 
The challenge then is to expand this new consumer market 
though pursuing a growth and development path that is suf-
ficiently job-creating and job-upgrading.   
It is identifying the key drivers of inclusive growth that are 
critical to alleviating Africa’s jobs challenge. While the pur-
suit of an inclusive growth agenda could encompass a range 
of interventions from a more optimal industrial policy to 
productivity-enhancing measures in agriculture; it must 
be underpinned by fundamental elements such as the ade-
quate supply of skilled workers, support for small and me-
dium enterprises, and investment in R&D and infrastructure 
(Bhorat, 2013b). 
IV Identifying the Growth Traps and Potential Opportunities 
in Africa
So far, much of the evidence above points to the potential of 
Africa’s rapidly expanding working age population in spur-
ring economic growth. The demographic dividend effect was 
no doubt central to the growth success of many East Asian 
economies in the latter half of the 1900s, with some esti-
mates suggesting that as much of one-third of its “economic 
miracle” can be accounted for by the demographic dividend 
effect5 (Bloom, Canning and Malaney, 2000). Equally, demo-
graphic changes have the potential to fuel economic growth 
in Africa, both as a source of labour and as an emerging con-
sumer class. Viewed globally as the world’s largest untapped 
market, some estimate African consumption expenditure 
will reach 1 trillion by 2020 (Hatch, Becker, and van Zyl, 
2012).  The East Asian experience, however, has also shown 
5 All the East Asian “Tiger” economies experienced a surge in savings and investment during their period of rapid economic growth, with the private savings 
rate in Taiwan (for which there is hood data on household savings) rising from about 5% in 1950 to over 20% in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Young, 
1995). Since savings rates vary by age group, with saving rates highest in the 50-64 age group with the younger cohort driving consumption demand, we 
would expect the changing age structure in Africa to also lead to increasing private savings and thus investment. 
one important job-generating growth strategy, which has 
worked in the high-success economies of East Asia.
Finally, growing Africa’s currently miniscule wage employ-
ment base must be a key growth strategy for African gov-
ernments. Expanding the light manufacturing sector is only 
With a young and low-earning African population, savings 
rates remain low in most of the countries across the conti-
nent, which points to the importance of accessing foreign 
savings to fund local development. As another of the trans-
formative shifts, the HLP (2013) report specifically calls for 
a new Global Partnership incorporating governments, civil 
society, and the private sectors to collectively think of inno-
vative ways to end poverty as well as to continue external aid 
funding particularly to low income countries. 
However, a growing and more important source of external 
financing is private capital flows from high- and middle-in-
come countries as pension and mutual funds, sovereign 
wealth funds and private corporations look to fast-growing 
economies such as Angola, Mozambique, and Ghana in search 
of higher returns (Bhorat, 2013b). This will require African 
countries to develop the capacity to absorb these large for-
eign capital flows and use them effectively to fund economic 
development projects as part of an investment-lead inclu-
sive growth strategy. 
The final transformative shift relates to promoting peace and 
effective, open, and accountable institutions, with the view 
that peace and good governance are central to well-being, 
not an ‘optional extra’. Transparent and accountable insti-
tutions are seen as necessary requirements for sustainable 
development, a requirement that is all the more important 
for Africa given its poor history of failed states. As Bhorat, 
2013b highlights, eight of the fifteen countries considered as 
‘failing’ on the Composite Resource Governance Index meas-
ure of the Revenue Watch Institute (2013) are in Africa. 
There remains much work to be done in Africa on establish-
ing predictable rules of law and stable institutions. These in 
turn promote a more stable macroeconomic environment 
and make these countries more attractive to foreign inves-
tors, enhancing the ability of these countries to optimally 
mobilise foreign savings. 
6
that the demographic dividend is necessary, but not suffi-
cient for long-term growth. One of the key elements of the 
East Asian success story was the supply of a highly-skilled 
and well-trained labour force – from 1966 to 1991, the pro-
portion of the working age population with a secondary ed-
ucation or more doubled in Hong Kong and Tawain, tripled 
in Korea and quadrupled in Singapore (Young, 1995). A large 
part of the East Asian growth story was thus built around 
this base of highly-skilled workers. For this growth potential 
to be harnessed, it is key, therefore, for African economies to 
investigate the skills need of their individual economies in 
order to develop the capabilities to address them. Only then 
will young workers be more productively employed and 
contribute towards a high-growth economy, instead of being 
trapped in low-value adding, low-wage employment.  
Since the 2007-08 financial crisis the growth performance 
of SSA has been strong, with a growth prediction of five per-
cent for 2013 (World Bank, 2013). In recent years, a number 
of African countries have been some of the fastest-growing 
countries in the world, albeit in many cases, off a very low 
base. Although economic growth is supported by strong 
domestic demand, the value of commodity exports con-
tinues to be an integral component of the region’s growth 
dynamics. Oil, metal, and other minerals exports increased 
from $56 billion in 2002 to $288 billion in 2012, which as a 
whole accounted for over two-thirds of total export growth 
during this period (World Bank, 2013). Therefore, the com-
modity-boom of the last decade has underpinned much of 
the region’s impressive growth performance but also leaves 
it more vulnerable to commodity price shocks. 
Economic literature has for a long-time cautioned against 
the developing country ‘resource curse’, however, more re-
cent evidence seems to suggest that this curse may not hold 
for all economies and that natural resources may actually 
have large positive effects (Lederman and Maloney, 2008). 
Africa’s resource abundance then holds the potential for sus-
tained robust economic growth, however, this will only be 
realised through the effective management of these resourc-
es and resource revenues, which is supported by strong gov-
ernance. The effective management of natural resources and 
the revenues they generate are essential to ensure that these 
resource-rich economies not only grow, but experience the 
kind of inclusive growth that is job-creating and promotes a 
diversification of the economy in a way that limits external 
vulnerability. 
One of the fundamental traps for Africa’s sustained growth 
is its poor infrastructure – from transport networks to basic 
utilities – which remains of poor quality, under-supplied and 
relatively more costly than in other developing regions. For 
example, road density per 100 square kilometres of arable 
land is 7.22 in Africa compared to a non-African developing 
country average of 127.11, electricity production measured 
in megawatts per million population is 386 compared to 
2,475, and transportation costs in Africa are more than twice 
than those in the BRIC6 countries (Beck, Maimbo, Faye and 
Triki, 2011). Estimates suggest that infrastructure hampers 
6 Brazil, the Russian Federation, India and China. 
economic growth on the continent by at least two percent 
each year and lowers the productivity of the private sector 
by up to 40 percent (Kaberuka, 2013). Work by the World 
Bank has also pointed to the fact that infrastructure supply 
bottlenecks are often a function of a lack of competitiveness 
in these markets for various forms of infrastructure provi-
sion. 
 
Furthermore, it is unlikely that domestic budgets along with 
Official Development Assistance are sufficient to close the 
infrastructure gap at a rapid enough pace. It is then up to Af-
rican economies to tap into private international capital. As 
investors look to developing regions for better returns, Af-
rican economies will become increasingly attractive if they 
are able to maintain macroeconomic and political stability, 
and enhance domestic institutions and the rule of law, un-
derpinned by a deepening of their local financial markets in 
order to improve their ability to absorb these flows. 
There are a few African economies that have already issued 
international sovereign bonds for the purposes of infra-
structure investment, including Ghana in 2007, Senegal in 
2009 and within the last year, both Zambia and Nigeria (IMF, 
2011). For most of these economies, debt-to-GDP levels re-
main moderate and so the effect of international issuance is 
to change the composition of debt away from multilateral 
and commercial creditors. However, for all African countries 
except South Africa, foreign borrowing remains denominat-
ed in foreign currencies, potentially creating currency mis-
matches on the respective governments’ balance sheets. This 
can be alleviated by accumulating sufficient international 
reserves, which are costly in and of themselves, but more 
generally points to the need for effective debt management 
to reduce external vulnerabilities when borrowing abroad.
Underpinning Africa’s ability to take advantage of these 
growth opportunities and overcome potential growth traps 
is the need for strong governance and the building of effec-
tive, transparent, and accountable institutions. A stable mac-
roeconomic environment and good management of public 
funds are key elements of a successful economy. It is not only 
issues related to democratic transition that impact on eco-
nomic performance but also include those surrounding the 
cost of doing business, which directly impacts the potential 
for a thriving private sector. The World Bank’s 2012 Doing 
Business Report data suggests that less than 40 percent of 
countries in SSA have put the application procedures for ob-
taining a construction permit online, and so access to this 
administrative information is subject to the physical pres-
ence of the applicant and meeting with an official (ICTSD, 
2012). Reform to key areas of business policy and the rule 
of law can help to unleash further growth potential, through 
reducing the transaction cost of doing business with and 
through governments. 
The above example also emphasises the great opportuni-
ty that Africa has to leap forward in its development path 
through embracing available technology, as was experienced 
with the mobile revolution but less so with the computer 
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and internet one. According to the World Bank (2013b), only 
15 percent of Africans have access to the internet, compared 
to a Latin American and Caribbean average of 44 percent, 
East Asia and Pacific at 37 percent, and a World average of 
36 percent. Identifying key areas and sectors of the econo-
my where ICT development can catalyse growth represents 
a critical opportunity for Africa to achieve sustainable inclu-
sive growth.
It is evident that Africa has much potential to achieve the 
long-term growth that is necessary for reducing inequali-
ty and alleviating poverty across the region. In order to do 
this, there are key pitfalls that need to be addressed, most 
importantly, infrastructure development and improved gov-
ernance and rule of law. Through addressing these funda-
mental elements, African economies can be guided towards 
higher-value adding sectors that create sustainable employ-
ment for the millions of young people that will be entering 
the work force in the next two decades. 
